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1. Feudalism revisited
About two years ago, a thought occurred to me, some might call it a nightmare. We
might not be far off a time when each and every human activity triggers a licence fee:
- A mental performance right secures royalties each time I read a book.
- A shoe design communication to the public right charges my credit card each time I
leave home in that pair of designer shoes.
- Goods (such as music or games) will expire after use.
- The world will be divided into property zones in which each citizen holds a royalty
account with a comprehensive provider of services. (Negotiations to integrate AOL
into the next generation of Windows operating system, Widows XP, failed only
recently over Microsoft’s demand that AOL agree not to challenge Microsoft in court
over antitrust matters.)
- And of course, such transactions would require a business method patent licence.
- The law would endorse a technology, called digital rights management, prohibiting
circumvention of protection measures.
Some of these examples already have had a brush with reality. Corporate activity by
multinational firms such as AOL TimeWarner, Bertelsmann, Disney, Coca Cola,
McDonald, Monsanto, Pfizer, Microsoft, IBM, Vivendi Universal, Sony appears to
2anticipate a world based on licensing agreements. As Monsanto’s CEO Robert
Shapiro suggested in an admirably frank interview in the Harvard Business Review in
1997 (Joan Magretta, “Growth Through Global Sustainability: An Interview with
Monsanto’s CEO, Robert B. Shapiro,” Harvard Business Review (January-February
1997): pp. 79-88, at 83:
“Nobody really wants to own carpet; they just want to walk on it. What would
happen if Monsanto or the carpet manufacturer owned that carpet and
promised to come in and remove it when it required replacing? ... We’re
starting to look at all our products and ask, What is it people really need to
buy? Do they need the stuff or just its function?”
Monsanto’s “teminator gen” that renders seeds infertile after cropping is in line with
such thinking.
Now, I deliberately overplayed this vision. I am no conspiracy theorist. The vision
may be labelled “A New Feudalism” because property relations are no longer based
on transfer of title. Feudalism, economic history tells us, was based on the notions of
conditional tenure, and grants in fee with ownership residing - perpetually and non-
transferable - in the Crown.
----------------------
2. The Licence Economy - some indicators
I claim that the licensing deal is one of the defining features of the post-industrial
economy. At this moment, empirical evidence is limited but here are some indicators
pointing to a dramic shift in property relations.
- Catalogue of Beatles publishing rights bought by Michael Jackson in 1985 for $ 50
million from a bankrupt Apple Records is today valued at $ 700 million (PATNEWS
Newsletter, 14 May 2001). 14 times increase in as many years - while McCartney is
alive, at least the term is not getting shorter.1
                                                
1 The music industry has operated something similar to a pay-per-use scheme since 1851, the formation
of French copyright collecting society SACEM. It is a valuable research site for anybody wishing to
study the licence economy. (cf. M. Kretschmer, C. Baden-Fuller, G.M. Klimis, R.Wallis),
“Enforcement and Appropriation of Music Intellectual Property Rights in Global Markets”, in
Globalization of Services (eds. Y. Aharoni, L. Nachum), London: Routledge (2000): pp. 163-196.
3- In 1990, IBM earned $30 million from patent licensing royalties; in 2000 royalties
reached nearly $1 billion. With annual grants of 2000 patents, they are top of the
patenting league. (Kevin G. Rivette and David Kline, “Discovering New Value in
Intellectual Property,” Harvard Business Review, January-February 2000, p. 56)
- Licensing his brand name and image has turned Michael Jordan into a business with
a $10 billion impact on the global economy, half of which benefited Nike. (Walter
LaFeber, 1999, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism, Norton).
- NewYork based investment bank Pullman has pioneered the securitization of
intellectual property assets, successfully placing a $55 million bond issue in 1998
secured against future royalties from David Bowie’s backcatalogue.2
Licensing contracts are deemed good business practice in “extracting value from
intellectual property”. Rivette and Kline suggest (HBR, p. 56) that patent licensing
produces “largely free cash flow ...  To match that sort of net revenue stream, IBM
would have to sell roughly $20 billion worth of additional products each year, or an
amount equal to one-fourth its worldwide sales.” Overall, patent licensing revenues
increased between 1998 and 1999 from $15 billion to $110 billion (Kevin G. Rivette
and David Kline, Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the hidden value of patents,
Harvard Business School Press, 2000, p. 6).
However, the offensive use of patent strategies has lead to what has been termed
“intellectual property congestion”, restricting the room for innovative activity for
example in the computing and electronics industries. In 2001, Hewlett-Packard settled
a dispute with Pitney Bowes (a Stamford-based $4 billion provider of mail, messaging
and document management solutions) over print technology patents for $400 million.
The dispute involved technology that created a smoother edge on the characters of
laser jet printers, making letters and numbers more readable. As a result of the
                                                
2 David Pullman commented: ‘Historically, entertainment and intellectual property owners could only
get substantial cash from their asset’s value by selling [my emphasis], while only minimal
opportunities to borrow against future cash flow existed before. Typically intellectual property owners
find their most valued assets are illiquid and undervalued. Due to the limited options of short term, low
leverage bank loans and the onerous terms of venture capital, major corporations have traditionally
acted as the bankers to their respective intellectual property industries. However, an advance from a
record company, for example, is a fully taxable event offered with high rates of return and significant
loss of control or even ownership. The size of the market cap of intellectual property and entertainment
assets is probably a trillion dollars.’ (interview data: M. Kretschmer, G.M. Klimis, R. Wallis, “Music in
Electronic Markets”, New Media & Society Vol 3(4): 417-441; 2001). Other music securitizations since
have involved Rod Steward, Iron Maiden, Rolling Stones and Elton John. Issueing banks included
Nomura, Merrill Lynch, Citibank and Morgan Stanley.
4settlement, the companies said they entered into a technology licensing agreement and
expect to pursue business and commercial relationships (SiliconValley.com
Newsletter, 4 June 2001).
Will this become the natural way of achieving technology transfer between feudal war
lords? It certainly suggests that the costs of conducting business in a litigious, patent
congested environment need to be subtracted from the licensing royalties which many
consultants promote as free cash flow.3
Having established a current trend towards licencing arrangements, I shall briefly
consider the legal concepts that make such property relations possible.
---------------------
3. The Propertization of Ideas, historically speaking
Paradoxically, the regulation of ideas first had to adopt the full paraphernalia of
exclusive, transferable property right, before threatening to revert to feudal
arrangements.
In economic history, the standard explanation for the evolution of well-defined,
secure, individualised property rights is that they are an efficient response to scarce
resources (North, Douglass C. & Thomas, Robert (1973), The Rise of the Western
World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: CUP; North, Douglass C. (1981),
Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton). Private property
rights prevent the overexploitation of a resource by those with no incentive to
conserve it (the so-called ‘Tragedy of the Commons’).4 Private property rights allow
the formation of prices, and make resources travel to their most valuable use.
Intellectual property does not fit easily into this picture. As our economically trained
colleagues, Bill Maughan, Peter Drahos and Nickolaus Thumm will soon tell us,
knowledge and information is a public good, and non-rivalreous in consumption. The
economist’s standard argument that “[f]ree usage of knowledge ends up with societies
that create too little new knowledge” (MIT economist Lester Thurow, “Needed: A
                                                
3 At the symposium, Jeremy Phillips offered an alternative interpretation of the settlement between HP
and Pitney Bowes: If a company of the stature of HP does not challenge the validity of a patent, no one
will. The law suit might be just a cover for anti-competitive behaviour.
4 The phrase ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ was coined by biologist Garrett Hardie in an article in Science
(1968).
5New System of Intellectual Property Rights,” Harvard Business Review (September-
October 1997), pp. 95-103, at p. 101) is harder to make (and empirically support) than
it seems.
I also share doubts whether one should treat the intellectual estates as one unified
property domain. Historically, the godfathers of intellectual property, patents,
copyright and trade marks are not property at all, if we rely on the economic
definition.
- Trade marks began as indicators of origin, today they are expressed as exclusive
brands that can be sold, franchised or merchandised. Trafficking in TM was banned
under the UK 1938 Act. Even under the 1994 Act, licensing can mean that a mark has
become liable to deceive and thus revocable (Cornish, W. R. (1999), Intellectual
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (4th ed.), London: Sweet
& Maxwell: 17-16 and 17-79).
- Copyright began as a regulation of reprinting for 14 years, today industrial products
derive their protection from the life span of an author (plus 50-70 years) during which
all conceivable forms of communication, including adaptation, remain the prerogative
of the owner (who typically is not the author).
In the pre-royalty era, a new piece of music was typically sold in its physical
instantiation, i.e. the manuscript. With the sale of the manuscript, all title claims
passed to the publisher. It appeared to be a straightforward transfer of property.5
Similarly, if a musician acquired a printed score, she appeared to suffer no further
restrictions of usage (apart from re-printing). The music could be performed in public
without further payment; it could be transcribed, arranged or simply copied.
(Friedemann Kawohl will have more to say on the paradigm shift in music copyright
around 1800)
- Patents began as a form of local protectionism (first English patents from 1565, for
example for attracting Huguenots glass makers whose knowledge already existed),
grew into an incentive to disclose, before turning into a strategic tool for manipulating
competition (discovering the bargaining and retaliatory power of patent portfolios).
                                                
5 Martin Kretschmer, “Intellectual Property in Music: A historical analysis of rhetoric and institutional
practices,” Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies Vol. 6 (2000), p. 205. Some composers
manipulated this convention to their own advantage by selling the same manuscript to different
publishers (e.g. Mozart, Beethoven).
6The process of propertization culminating in the TRIPs agreement of 1994 took place
largely without public debate. IP law mostly evolved as an incremental response to
technological change.
----------------
4. Retreat?
Attempts to re-structure areas central to a society’s economic, social and cultural
well-being around licensing arrangements based on exclusive property rights will
become politically sensitive. We already may have reached a crossroads which we
hope to explore further today.
In April, a case brought by 39 pharmaceutical companies against the South African
government over the parallel importing of generic AIDS drugs - allegedly in violation
of TRIPs obligations - collapsed. (Indian generic manufacturer Cipla offers copies of
patented three-drug combinations for £250, which cost around £10000/year if
supplied by licensed suppliers).
I just read the submission of the EU to the special meeting of the TRIPs Council last
Wednesday (convened in response to issues raised by the South African case) in
which it is argued that Articles 7 (‘Objectives’: ‘social and economic welfare’) and 8
(‘Principles’: allowing members to take measures necessary to protect public health,
provided such measures are consistent with TRIPs) “were not drafted as general
exception clauses”. Contrast WTO Director-General Mike Moore’s statement on the
day that “countries must feel secure that they can use this flexibility.” This is a sign of
retreat from propertization.
Other examples of corporate retreat include Monsanto’s forced withdrawal of the
terminator gene. Revolution has been threatened in the music industry where a heavy-
handed response to the digital distribution of music has spurred a host of underground
sites subverting corporate control. Competition/anti-trust law intervention
investigating dominant market positions arising from the control of intellectual
property are increasing (e.g. EC investigation of BMG-Warner-EMI venture
MusicNet, and Sony and Vivendi’s Pressplay).
--------------
75. The Future
Where do we go from here?
In 2000, the IP Task Force (part of the Creative Industries Programme at the UK
Dept. of Culture, Media & Sport) commissioned MORI to investigate public attitudes
to intellectual property. On 21 October 200, MORI conducted a focus group with
participants from a nationally representative Panel of 5000 people. Under the Heading
“The value that people attach to IP”, MORI offers recurring attitudes such as:
• IP is too often used by large corporations to protect their profits at the
public’s expense
• IP is too seldom used to protect the interests of lone individuals
• IP used to create a monopoly over production of a product or service is
anti-competitive
• IP used to protect ideas that have not yet become tangible
prototypes/products hinders creativity
• People who contravene IP law as a ‘one-off’ should not be punished
"Where [IP] is seen as most important is through enforcing standards and protecting
consumer rights.”
MORI concludes that this attitude (that IP law should benefit the consumer) must be
the result of a confusion. “There are clear problems with the public understanding and
attitudes towards IP.”
I would suggest that legal regulation will need to respond to these public attitudes, not
vice versa. Copying without commercial gain, for example, is expressly condoned by
the MORI respondents and appears to carry significant public benefits. Over the last
150 years, right holders, right distributors and their lawyers have been the dominant
players of the so-called Patent, Copyright and Trade Mark Communities. This is
about to change. The public will engage in fundamental normative discourse – a
discourse that does not accept the premise of lawyers trained in defending existing
rights on their clients behalf. Today, we have economists, political scientists,
sociologists, philosophers, historians and legal scholars providing a wide range of
material on the normative premises underlying intellectual property and likely
developments. I look forward to a lively afternoon.
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